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Abstract— Shared care concepts such as managed care and
continuity of care are based on extended communication and
co-operation between different health professionals or between
them and the patient respectively. Health information systems
and their components, which are very different in their struc-
ture, behaviour, data and their semantics as well as regarding
implementation details used in different environments for dif-
ferent purposes, have to provide intelligent interoperability.
Therefore, flexibility, portability, knowledge-based interoper-
ability and future-orientation must be guaranteed using the
newest development of model driven architecture. The ongo-
ing work for the German health telematics platform based on
an architectural framework and a security infrastructure is
described in some detail. This concept of future-proof health
information networks with virtual electronic health records as
core application starts with multifunctional electronic health
cards. It fits into developments currently performed by many
other developed countries. The paper introduces into the Ger-
man health telematics platform and its tools based on smart
card.
Keywords— health telematics, model driven architecture, elec-
tronic health record, smart cards, patient health card, health
professional card, security, privacy.
1. Introduction
Any communication and co-operation between healthcare
providers must be supported by intelligently interoperable
health information systems. This challenge needs to be met
especially for managed care and continuity of care concepts
widely introduced in most of the developed countries to im-
prove quality and efficiency of patient’s care. In shared care
environments – health professionals belonging to different
healthcare establishments with different legal background,
using different methods to perform different procedures,
supported by different applications provided by different
vendors and following different protocols, applied at dif-
ferent time – have to be deployed for co-operatively caring
the same patient in an optimal way.
Interoperability might be provided at different levels. Those
interoperability levels are ranging from simple data ex-
change and meaningful data exchange with agreed vocabu-
lary to a functional interoperability with agreed commu-
nicating applications’ behaviour, or finally to a service-
oriented or semantic interoperability directly invoking the
applications’ services.
Health information systems enabling such advanced co-
operation mentioned above in the managed care context are
characterised by openness, scalability, flexibility, portabil-
ity, distribution at Internet level, service-oriented interoper-
ability, as well as appropriate security and privacy services.
Finally, they have to be based on standards [1].
2. The German health telematics
platform
As many other countries, Germany has launched a national
programme for establishing a health telematics platform
supporting seamless care [2, 3]. This platform combines
card-enabled communication mediated by the patient with
network-based interoperability between all actors involved.
For the patient data card, called the German electronic
health card, a multi-purpose microprocessor card is used.
It will serve as a health insurance card, an immunisation
and vaccination passport, emergency data and electronic
prescription carrier, a carrier for pointers to the patient’s
electronic health record (EHR) components or related in-
formation such as drug information distributed on the net,
and an information carrier for facilitating managed care and
quality assurance.
Fig. 1. Functional blocks of the electronic health card.
A specifically protected compartment contains information
the patient likes to hide from reading by others. Addi-
tionally, the electronic health card provides basic secu-
rity services based on cryptographic algorithms, such as
strong authentication, integrity, accountability, and encod-
ing/decoding services deploying the qualified electronic
signature [4] and a related public key infrastructure (PKI).
To support trustworthy interoperability between patients
and health professionals, the latter use health professional
cards (HPC) for adequate security services. For any access
to data others than the emergency data set and the blind
box/safe (the latter can only be opened by the patient as
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mentioned above), the HPC as electronic doctor’s license
is required providing personal and role authentication. Se-
curity services support both communication and application
security services for any principals such as users, devices,
systems, applications, components, or objects.
The health card should be rolled out by 2006. It complies
with the corresponding European health insurance card,
which will be implemented in all EU member states un-
til 2008. As important tool, the aforementioned HPC is
a prerequisite for the health telematics platform and should
be rolled out before 2006 too. The HPC is described in
more detail in the following section.
Figure 1 shows the functional blocks of the German elec-
tronic health card. The blocks can be separately protected
at different levels.
3. The German health professional
card specification
Based on results of the European TrustHealth project [5]
and the first HPC standard CEN ENV 13729 [6], the
German HPC V 1.0 specification has been approved
at 1999 [7], combined with political decisions setting up the
legal and organisational framework in December 1997 al-
Fig. 2. Surface of the German health professional card for physi-
cians (HPC). Front side (a) and reverse side (b).
ready. The electronic physicians’ ID is intended to com-
pletely replace the currently used paper based classical
physicians’ ID. For this reason the physicians’ ID will have
a distinctive card cover with the following general layout
(Fig. 2).
The general structure and the dependency hierarchy for po-
tential communication in the German health care system
are indeed defined in an extremely heterogeneous man-
ner (Fig. 3). There are many different players involved,
i.e., medical associations, statutory health insurance (HI)
administrations, physicians, hospitals, pharmacies, and in-
surers – only to name just a few. Definitely, a considerable
number of communication pathways are already in place.
However, the number of paths and the amount of infor-
mation transmitted may easily be considered minor when
compared to the potential needs of all of the other com-
munication expected in health care. If just 10 000 physi-
cians (of more than 380 000 registered in Germany) would
possibly wish to exchange electronic data items of their
patients among at least one another, this amount would
completely surpass any of today’s volumes by far. A well-
established infrastructure is necessary to cope with the ex-
pected amount of information circulated among Germany’s
health professionals.
Fig. 3. Communication pathways.
It seems to be reasonable that at least three major factors
need to work together, for any communication to work:
• basically, health professionals need to have a reli-
able method for addressing each other; this consti-
tutes a nearly solved problem, since the majority of
physicians already have some type of unique e-mail
presence; the HPC will fill the remaining gaps by pro-
viding all health professionals with a distinguished
name (DN);
• secondly, any communication in healthcare and wel-
fare has to take place securely and confidentially; the
participants must know and be able to prove who they
are “talking” to; this is another major issue addressed
by the German HPC development;
• finally, once health professionals can actually ex-
change data, this has to be done in a form which
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allows them to really make use of the data trans-
mitted; a basic consensus concerning content stan-
dards for verbal data, images, lab results, etc., has
to be achieved for transmission to be interoperable;
here, industry and standardisation initiatives like ISO,
CEN, DICOM, HL7, IEEE, etc., play an increasingly
important role.
All three factors need to work together, like the pillars sup-
porting a platform. This platform itself consists of the inter-
operable connections between different network providers
who offer their customers transmission facilities. A reduc-
tion of providers is neither feasible nor desirable and so in-
teroperability on all of these levels becomes paramount.
Fig. 4. Functional structure of German HPC.
Looking more closely at the details, the German physi-
cians’ ID contains a total of five different functions (Fig. 4).
1. The first function is that of a classic identification
card which a physician can use in a number of dif-
ferent settings, e.g., when ordering prescription drugs
in a pharmacy where he is not known. To this pur-
pose the card is personalised with name and picture,
completely replacing the classic paper ID which any
physician can apply for today.
2. The first electronic function is that of a simple ba-
sic certificate providing authentication to any digital
device this card is presented to. Here, a fast and sim-
ple method for easy identification was realised tak-
ing into account that this approach can only be used
in an otherwise already secure setting, since there
is no special security against theft. This trade-off be-
tween security and simplicity will certainly find its
use, since it is intended as a direct electronic ana-
logue to the physical presentation of the classic iden-
tification card.
3. The second electronic function is that of being car-
rier of an asymmetric key pair (more specifically, the
private key of the key pair) for the strong authenti-
cation in a client/server environment. A public key
infrastructure has to be put into place, where virtu-
ally any unit can look up or download the public
key of a health professional and can then make use
of it to check the private key of the person presenting
his identification in any type of clinical setting. This
enables the implementation of strong security in an
otherwise untrusted environment.
4. The next major element is bearing another key
pair (again, the private key of an asymmetric key
is stored on the card) for the implementation of a hy-
brid (symmetric/asymmetric) transport encryption.
This is where transportation protocols like HCPP,
S/MIME, etc., can come into play by defining how
the messages interchanged are to be encrypted and
decrypted.
5. The final element of the HPC is the private key of an
asymmetric key pair for the production of a legally
binding electronic signature according to the German
signature law (SigG). The specifics of the health pro-
fessional are contained in a number of attribute cer-
tificates which he can append to his signature, spec-
ifying his role in medicine.
From a more technical point of view, the HPC is a contact-
based smart card capable to process public key (PK) al-
gorithms. The physical characteristics shall comply with
ISO/IEC 7816-1 and related standards. An HPC is a nor-
mal size card (ID-001 card). Another card layout is the
so-called institutional card (SMC) that could easily be con-
sidered a plug-in card (ID-000) for secure devices, e.g., in
pharmacies.
Fig. 5. Internal structure of German HPC.
As shown in Fig. 5, the HPC contains:
• some elementary files (EF) at the master file (MF)
level for some general data objects and the card ver-
ifiable (CV) certificate;
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• the HP application (HPA) providing the following
services:
– electronic identification of the health profes-
sional,
– electronic signature creation,
– client/server authentication,
– document decipherment,
– card-to-card authentication (HPC/eGK and
HPC/SMC);
• the cryptographic information application (CIA)
providing information for the primary system
(e.g., a doctor’s office system) to support the com-
munication between the system and an HPC.
The HPC security mechanisms require different types of
end user certificates:
• electronic (digital) signature certificate(s) (X.509 v3,
type: electronic signature certificate(s), i.e., public
key certificate and attribute certificate(s)), here called
C.DS;
• authentication certificate (X.509 v3, type: authenti-
cation certificate), here called C.AUT;
• key encipherment certificate (X.509 v3, type: key
encipherment certificate), here called C.KE.
In addition to the aforementioned certificate types all con-
taining a key, additional certificates without a key (so-
called attribute certificates) complete the card infrastruc-
ture. Attribute certificates in the context of the German
HPC do rule certain aspects of permission (C.ATTR.P) and
qualification (C.ATTR.Q).
4. The bIT4health project
To guarantee future-proof principles for designing and
implementing common basic services of the aforemen-
tioned health telematics platform, an architectural frame-
work and a security infrastructure have been defined
and demonstrated as a proof of concept within the Ger-
man project for improving the German healthcare system
through the deployment of information and communica-
tion technology. This project has been called bIT4health
(better IT for health) [8].
This architectural framework is characterised by different
paradigms such as:
• distribution for openness;
• component-orientation for scalability and flexibility;
• interoperability at service level reflecting concepts
and knowledge expressed through formal models for
enabling conformance agreements;
• separation of platform-independent and platform-
specific modelling separating logic and technologic
views on system components as well as;
• installation of reference and domain models.
The latter properties enable openness, portability and
future-proof investments for the solutions provided. The ap-
proach completely complies with the advanced paradigms
including the model driven architecture presented in this
paper.
5. Modelling systems
For describing systems and their behaviour in an appropri-
ate way, real systems need to be modelled. A model might
hide internal structural complexity, or might be focused
on specific aspects of the system such as form or special
functions. Beside this way of simplification of complex sys-
tems by modelling them, grouping elements of a system ac-
cording to specific commonalities in structure and/or func-
tion makes system design, development, and maintenance
manageable, realisable, and eligible for financing. The re-
sult are components which can be designed, manufactured,
improved separately from other components, however keep-
ing in mind and enabling reasonable interoperation between
related components.
To reduce the complexity of the whole healthcare system
consisting of many subsystems following the shared care
paradigm, a single unrealistic comprehensive information
system covering every thinkable procedure, fact and result
will be realised by subsystems constraint to specific tasks,
content, etc. In other words, we move from systems to com-
ponents.
An information system is reflecting processes happening
in the real world, by that way on the one hand establishing
an information-related model of reality and on the other
hand implementing a real system. Models are systems
consisting of components, too. The component paradigm
is a basic paradigm which is applicable to real systems but
also to models of reality [1].
6. MDA-based architectural framework
and security infrastructure
For keeping such complex national project’s specifica-
tion and implementation manageable, the architectural
framework including the security infrastructure as its in-
tegral part is strictly based on the ISO 10746 reference
model – open distributed processing (RM-ODP) [9]. This
concerns all newly developed applications, common ser-
vices components, but also analysis and migration of legacy
systems.
The ISO RM-ODP considers every component in dis-
tributed interoperable systems from different viewpoints,
thereby abstracting from complex reality to interesting
constraints such as concepts, contexts, structure, or be-
haviour (Fig. 6). Thus, a component’s purpose (busi-
ness view, scenario, policy), the information needed to
describe the content (attributes) and function (operations)
of a component (information view), component’s functional
aggregation (computational view), physical distribution
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(engineering view), and implementation and operation prin-
ciples (technology view) have been specified.
Fig. 6. Abstraction matrix of components.
Components can be composed/decomposed providing dif-
ferent levels of details or granularity. Starting from the
granularity level of basic concepts of the corresponding
domain, the complexity of aggregated components reflect-
ing the application needed may be increased according to
the users’ needs. By that way, stand-alone applications, dis-
tributed applications or even highly complex networks can
be implemented. In that context structural and functional
complexity has to be considered as well. Components and
their level of granularity can be selected according to the
users’ needs [1, 10].
In the first phase of modelling, the platform-independent
specification of the components’ properties is performed
describing the business, the information, and the computa-
tional viewpoint of every component needed. Those mod-
els are portable to any environment with specific database
models, operating systems’ requirements, etc. This spec-
ification is transferred into the second phase of platform-
specific modelling, covering the engineering and the tech-
nology viewpoint.
The separation of platform-independent and platform-
specific models, distinguishing logic and technologic as-
pects is the core idea of Object Management Group’s
model driven architecture (MDA) for component-oriented
information systems [11]. The specification of platform-
independent models (PIM) is supported by appropriate
tools. The transfer into platform-specific models (PSM)
is automatically performed by tools. Both phases describe
system components at meta-level using, e.g., the unified
modeling language (UML) still abstracting from implemen-
tation details. The resulting graphical vocabulary can be
transferred into verbal constraint models using the exten-
sible markup language (XML). All models are developed
starting from coarse description up to fine grained special-
isation.
Thereby, the models follow the approach of the generic
component model based on the ISO reference model – open
distributed processing. For model management and the au-
tomatic development of running application at runtime, cor-
responding tools will be deployed. In a model driven ar-
chitecture, the implementation is automatically performed
using tools as demonstrated in the HARP project running
at the Magdeburg Medical Informatics Department [12]. In
the next section, this project will be shortly introduced.
Because different views can be described independently by
domain experts, available knowledge can be exploited and
specific terminologies can be applied correctly. For exam-
ple, the concepts knowledge of medical doctors or proce-
dural experience of administrators will be expressed in do-
main models referring to an information reference model
established by IT experts. Beside agreed methodologies
and tooling, accepted terminology maintained in a repos-
itory is a basic requirement. This terminology and ontol-
ogy will be reused from SNOMEDr with its extensions
SNOMED RTr and SNOMED CTr as well as from the
UMLSr created by the US NLM and meanwhile inter-
nationally maintained with important contributions by the
British NHS. The outcome is transferred considering engi-
neering aspects related to, e.g., the specific database model,
which can be managed by DB experts.
Fig. 7. MDA development nd expression means.
All different development phases from general requirements
analysis over domain-specific views up to implementation
and maintenance of any HIS can be described by MDA.
Therefore, MDA allows also dealing with legacy systems
to define interfaces and levels of interoperability. Figure 7
presents the MDA schema including the expression means
used. As meta-languages, UML and XML have been in-
troduced as mentioned already. Because of some weak-
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nesses of the approved version UML 1.4, tools supporting
the emerging UML version 2.0 have been used.
7. System integration
and migration paths
Keeping in mind that systems consist of hierarchically
built subsystems or capsules as shown in Fig. 8, at least
three different levels of interoperability can be modelled
and implemented starting at the highest level of service-
oriented collaboration between directly related components
(Fig. 9).
Fig. 8. Hierarchically built capsules.
Fig. 9. Interoperability level.
The next level comprises aggregated services mediated
either by super-component interactions or by the ex-
change of messages via architecture-independent interfaces
(e.g., HL7 V2.x) [13]. Finally, proprietary communication
or database import/export functions might be established.
The aggregation of components and – by implementing
them – services is mediated by components, in analogy
to CORBA establishing horizontal or vertical services de-
pending on the usability of those services by all domains
or by a special one.
Platform-specific issues are kept out of scope as long as
possible to enable a future proof HIS characterised by the
aforementioned properties. For final implementation, they
have to be realised, however.
8. Electronic health record
Because all facts directly or indirectly established during
patient’s care are needed for its optimised management,
shared care information systems and networks have to be
based on a comprehensive and lifelong virtual EHR sys-
tem as the HIS core application. Therefore, the German
health telematics platform must be completed by a modern
EHR architecture, which is also open, component-based
and model-driven, etc.
The EHR architecture deployed in the German health telem-
atics project will be based on specifications provided by the
revised CEN ENV 13606 “Electronic Health Record Com-
munication” [14] and international projects and initiatives
such as the openEHR Foundation [15]. Accordingly, the
German electronic health card provides a tiny EHR ex-
tract. Furthermore, it establishes a tool (pointer facilities)
for managing EHR systems in a patient-controlled way.
9. Architecture and security
infrastructure implementation
Beside the definition and demonstration of an architectural
framework and security infrastructure as German health
telematics platform, the roll-out of that approach first man-
ages the card-enabled environment, and second provides
basics and migration path for a future-proof ICT support-
ing shared care.
In that context, the acceptance of the solution by patients
and health professionals including responsible and influenc-
ing bodies within the German healthcare and social system
is inevitable. For that reason, the creation of acceptance by
public relation activities, support of the ministry in creation
of positive opinions and resonance is an important work
package. Additionally, the project management, quality as-
surance and quality management as well as an appropriate
scientific accompaniment of the project are crucial success
factors.
10. Conclusion
Modelled as a multi-model approach at meta-model level,
the future-proof secure health information system (HIS) is
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a virtual, at runtime self-organising architecture consisting
of certified components which exchange digitally signed
and attributed XML messages.
Reference model, constraint models, terminology, and
methodology have to comply with international standards
or must be standardised.
Following the challenging example of other countries such
as Australia, Denmark, Finland, the USA, and certainly
some others, Germany launched a programme for estab-
lishing a health telematics platform, which has to comply
with the advanced paradigm of component-based MDA sys-
tems. First feasibility studies have been performed within
the European HARP project the Magdeburg Medical In-
formatics Department being responsible for the modelling
part has been involved in.
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